

Towards multi-refinement for the *LeanMachines* Framework

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Supervised by Frédéric Peschanski and Romain Demangeon

- 1 The Framework *LeanMachines*
 - The notion of machine
 - The notion of event
 - Refinement
- 2 Adding Multi-refinement to the framework
 - Example
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Introduction

The Event B method

- Formal method for state-based reactive systems

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- Inspired by the Event B method
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 - Typed functional programming language,
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 - A proof assistant
- Specification, implementation, proofs of corrections, all in one go !

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
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Events

- Guarded transitions




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 - $\text{guard } (m : M) (x : \alpha) : \text{Prop}$
 - $\text{action } (m : M) (x : \alpha) (\text{grd} : \text{guard } m \ x) : M \times \beta$




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- Events **must** respect certain properties (**proof obligations** for the user)



Definition of a machine(formalisation)¹

```
class Machine (CTX : Type u) (M) where
  context : CTX
  invariant : M → Prop
```

The Machine typeclass

¹The code presented in these slides is a simplified version of the code of *LeanMachines*, complete version can be found here : <https://github.com/lean-machines-central/lean-machines>

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context : static part of the system
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invariant : properties the user wants to
specify about the machine

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Definition of a machine (example)

Model of a bounded buffer

- The *size* of the buffer must be bounded by *maxSize*

```
structure BufContext where  
  maxSize : Nat  
  maxSizeProp : maxSize > 0
```

```
structure B0 (ctx : BufContext) where  
  size : Nat
```

Definition of a machine (example)

Model of a bounded buffer

- The *size* of the buffer must be bounded by *maxSize*
- We **specify** this by instantiating the typeclass *Machine*

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```

```
  maxSize : Nat
```

```
  maxSizeProp : maxSize > 0
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```
structure B0 (ctx : BufContext) where
```

```
  size : Nat
```

```
instance: Machine BufContext (B0 ctx)
```

```
  where
```

```
    context := ctx
```

```
    invariant b0 := b0.size ≤ ctx.maxSize
```

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Adding an element to the buffer

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
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Adding an element to the buffer

- $\text{size} := \text{size} + 1$
- The guard needs to check that this operation will not exceed the bound !

```
def B0.Put : Event (B0 ctx) Unit Unit :=  
{  
  guard := fun b0 _ =>  
    b0.size < ctx.maxSize  
  action := fun b0 _ _ =>  
    ((), { size := b0.size + 1 })  
}
```

Proof Obligation : *safety*




What is a Proof Obligation ?

- **Users** need to prove them when they specify the system
- The *safety* PO, for example, guarantees that the invariant won't be broken by the event's action.

$\text{safety } (m : M) (x : \alpha) : \text{Machine.invariant } m \rightarrow (\text{grd} : \text{ev.guard } m \ x) \rightarrow \text{Machine.invariant } (\text{ev.action } m \ x \ \text{grd}).\text{snd}$


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
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Proof of the *safety* PO for Put

The steps of the proof

1 Goal:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{b0.size} \leq \text{ctx.maxSize} \rightarrow (\text{grd} : \text{b0.size} < \text{ctx.maxSize}) \\ & \rightarrow ((((), \text{size} := \text{b0.size} + 1).snd).size \leq \text{ctx.maxSize} \end{aligned}$$

```
safety := fun b0 x =>  
by
```

Proof of the *safety* P0 for Put

The steps of the proof

1 Goal:

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```
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```

```
by
```

```
simp
```


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$$b0.size \leq ctx.maxSize \rightarrow (grd : b0.size < ctx.maxSize) \rightarrow b0.size + 1 \leq ctx.maxSize$$

3 Goal : $b0.size + 1 \leq ctx.maxSize$

- $hinv : b0.size \leq ctx.maxSize$
- $hgrd : b0.size < ctx.maxSize$

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```
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```

Refinement between machines

am

m

What is Machine Refinement ?

- Relation between specifications (one is the abstraction of the other)

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
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Example of refinement between machines

Abstract Buffer (B0) : counter

- The context consists of the bound ($ctx.maxSize$) and the property that it is non null ($ctx.maxSizeProp$)
- $size : \mathbb{N}$
- Invariant : $b0.size \leq ctx.maxSize$

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- same context as the abstract one
- $stack : List \alpha$
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 $b1.stack.length \leq ctx.maxSize$

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The refinement relation

- Correspondance between the two machines : $size$ corresponds to the length of $stack$.



```
refine am m      := am.size = m.stack.length
```

```
refine_safe am m :=
  by
    simp[Machine.invariant]
    intros hinv_ccr href
    rw[href]
    exact hinv_ccr
```

Refinement between events

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
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
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
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
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 - A Proof Obligation about the guards (*strengthening*)




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
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 - A Proof Obligation about the action (*simulation*)




Proof Obligation : *strengthening*


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
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
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
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
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

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

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

$\text{Machine.invariant } m \rightarrow \text{ev.guard } m \ x \rightarrow \forall$
 $\text{am, refine am } m \rightarrow \text{abs.guard am (lift_in } x)$

Proof Obligation: *simulation*


$\text{simulation } (m : M) (x : \alpha):$
 $(\text{Hinv} : \text{Machine.invariant } m)$
 $\rightarrow (\text{Hgrd} : \text{ev.guard } m \ x)$
 $\rightarrow \forall \text{ am}, (\text{Href} : \text{refine am } m)$
 $\rightarrow \text{let } (y, m') := \text{ev.action } m \ x \ \text{Hgrd}$
 $\text{let } (z, \text{am}') := \text{abs.action am } (\text{lift_in } x)$
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Proof Obligation: *simulation*


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
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Example of Event refinement : Put

Add an element to the buffer (B0)

- $\text{size} := \text{size} + 1$
- *size* must be strictly below the bound

```
def B0.Put : Event (B0 ctx) Unit Unit :=
{
  guard := fun b0 _ =>
    b0.size < ctx.maxSize
  action := fun b0 _ _ =>
    (((), { size := b0.size + 1 })
}
```

Add an element to the buffer (B1)

- Insertion at the head of the list
- The length of the list must be strictly below the bound

```
def B1.Put : Event (B0 ctx) α Unit :=
{
  guard := fun b1 _ =>
    b1.length < ctx.maxSize
  action := fun b1 x _ =>
    (((), { stack := x :: b1.stack })
}
```

Example of Event refinement : Put

Lift of the Inputs/Outputs

- $lift_in : \alpha \rightarrow Unit := \lambda_.$
- $lift_out : Unit \rightarrow Unit := \lambda x.x$

Example of Event refinement : Put

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Strengthening

strengthening (m : B1) (x : α):
m.stack.length $\leq$ maxSize
 $\rightarrow$ m.stack.length < maxSize
 $\rightarrow \forall am : B0, am.size = m.stack.length$
 $\rightarrow am.size < maxSize$

Example of Event refinement : Put

Lift of the Inputs/Outputs

- $lift_in : \alpha \rightarrow Unit := \lambda_.$
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Strengthening

```
strengthening (m : B1) (x :  $\alpha$ ):
m.stack.length  $\leq$  maxSize
 $\rightarrow$  m.stack.length  $<$  maxSize
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 $\rightarrow am.size < maxSize$ 
```

Simulation


```
simulation (m : B1) (x :  $\alpha$ ):
(Hinv : m.stack.length  $\leq$  maxSize)
 $\rightarrow$  (Hgrd : m.stack.length  $<$  maxSize)
 $\rightarrow \forall am : B0, (Href: am.size = m.stack.length)$ 
 $\rightarrow$  let (y, m') := ((), stack := x::m.stack)
let (z, am') := ((), size := size + 1)

y = z  $\wedge$  am'.size = m'.stack.length
```

- 1 The Framework *LeanMachines*
 - The notion of machine
 - The notion of event
 - Refinement
- 2 Adding Multi-refinement to the framework
 - Example
 - Encoding of the proof obligations
 - Related works
- 3 Conclusions and future works
- 4 Bibliography


What is Multi-refinement

- With *LeanMachines*, we can specify systems through simple refinement (one abstract machine per concrete machine)




What is Multi-refinement

- With *LeanMachines*, we can specify systems through simple refinement (one abstract machine per concrete machine)
- Sometimes, multiple machines are an abstraction of the same concrete one



What is Multi-refinement

- With *LeanMachines*, we can specify systems through simple refinement (one abstract machine per concrete machine)
- Sometimes, multiple machines are an abstraction of the same concrete one
- We would like to allow multiple refinement in the framework in order to combine and **reuse** specifications



Multi-refinement : the pushBuffer

[Pes24]

Bounded buffer (B0)

State $size : \mathbb{N}$

Invariant : $size \leq \text{SizeMax}$

Events : Push an element in the buffer

Button

State $pushed : \mathbb{B}$

Invariant : $True$

Events : push / release the button

Multi-refinement : the pushBuffer

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State $pushed : \mathbb{B}$

Invariant : $True$

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The pushBuffer

State $stack : List\ \alpha, pushed : \mathbb{B}$

Invariant : $stack.length \leq max$

Events : push the button (which pushes an arbitrary element of type α to in buffer)

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

Bounded buffer (B0) : Put

guard : $size + 1 \leq SizeMax$

action : $size := size + 1$

Button : Push

guard : $\neg pressed$

action : $pressed := true$

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

Bounded buffer (B0) : Put

guard : $size + 1 \leq SizeMax$

action : $size := size + 1$

Button : Push

guard : $\neg pressed$

action : $pressed := true$

The pushBuffer : PushAdd

guard : $stack.length + 1 \leq SizeMax \wedge \neg pressed$

action : $stack := x :: stack, pushed := true$

Previous version of the API (refinement)

```

structure _REventPO [Machine ACTX AM] [Machine CTX M] [instR: Refinement AM M]
  (ev : _Event M  $\alpha$   $\beta$ ) ( $\alpha'$   $\beta'$ )
  extends _EventPO ev where
  abstract : _Event AM  $\alpha'$   $\beta'$ 
  lift_in :  $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha'$ 
  lift_out :  $\beta \rightarrow \beta'$ 
  strengthening (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ):
  /- [...] -/
  simulation (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ):
  /- [...] -/

structure OrdinaryREvent (AM) [Machine ACTX AM] (M) [Machine CTX M]
[instR: Refinement AM M]
  ( $\alpha$   $\beta$ ) ( $\alpha' := \alpha$ ) ( $\beta' := \beta$ ) extends _Event M  $\alpha$   $\beta$  where
  po : _REventPO (instR := instR) to_Event
   $\alpha'$   $\beta'$ 

```


The issue with this version

```
def PushBuffer.PushAdd : OrdinaryREvent
  (B0 ctx) (PushBuffer ctx α) α Unit :=
{ guard m _      := /- [...] -/
  action m x _    := /- [...] -/
  po := { abstract := B0.Put
        safety    := /- [...] -/
        }
}
```

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  (Button) (PushBuffer ctx α) α Unit :=
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Limits of the use of structure

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- We need to define **everything** about the event (action, guard, safety, refinement PO) at once

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Limits of the use of `structure`

- We need to define **everything** about the event (action, guard, safety, refinement PO) at once
- It's not possible to **combine** structure definitions

⇒ Does not allow *multi-refinement* !

The use of *typeclass* (safe events)

```
class SafeEventPO [Machine CTX M] { $\alpha$   $\beta$ } (ev : Event M  $\alpha$   $\beta$ ) where
  safety (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ):
    Machine.invariant m
    → (grd : ev.guard m x)
    → Machine.invariant (ev.action m x grd).snd
```

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```

- Proof obligations are thus summed up in a *typeclass* specifying the properties (safety, refinement of events, etc.)
- We add steps to the definition of events :
 - 1 Define its action and guard
 - 2 Instantiate the *typeclass* that correspond to what the user wants to prove about the event

The use of *typeclass* (refinement)

```

class SafeREventPO { $\alpha$   $\beta$   $\alpha'$   $\beta'$ }
  [Machine ACTX AM] [Machine CTX M]
  [instR: Refinement AM M]
  (ev : Event M  $\alpha$   $\beta$ )
  (abs : Event AM  $\alpha'$   $\beta'$ )
  [instSafeAbs : SafeEventPO abs]
  [instSafeEv : SafeEventPO ev]
where
  lift_in :  $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha'$ 
  lift_out :  $\beta \rightarrow \beta'$ 
  strengthening (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ): /- [...]
    -/
  simulation (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ):      /- [...]
    -/

```

The use of *typeclass* (refinement)

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- We require that *safety* was discharged through *typeclass* constraints (*instSafeAbs* and *instSafeEv*)

The use of *typeclass* (refinement)

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    -/

```

- We require that *safety* was discharged through *typeclass* constraints (*instSafeAbs* and *instSafeEv*)
- There can be multiple instantiation of this *typeclass* for the same concrete event !

Coherence with previous API (Events)

```
structure OrdinaryEvent (M)
[Machine CTX M] ( $\alpha$   $\beta$  : Type) where
  guard (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ) : Prop
  action (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ )
    (grd : guard m x) :  $\beta \times M$ 
  safety (m : M) (x :  $\alpha$ ) :
    Machine.invariant m
    → (grd : guard m x)
    → Machine.invariant
      (action m x grd).2

instance instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent
[Machine CTX M]
(ev : OrdinaryEvent M  $\alpha$   $\beta$ ) :
  SafeEventPO ev.toEvent
where
  safety := ev.safety
```

Coherence with previous API (Events)

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- We want to keep an API based on structures

Coherence with previous API (Events)

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    SafeEventPO ev.toEvent
where
  safety := ev.safety

```

- We want to keep an API based on structures
- We are able to switch to the use of *typeclass* with *instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent*

Multiple refinement of Specifications (example)

Bounded buffer (B0)

State *size* : $\mathbb{N}$

Invariant : $\text{size} \leq \text{SizeMax}$

Events : Push an element in the buffer

Button

State *pushed* : $\mathbb{B}$

Invariant : *True*

Events : push / release the button

Multiple refinement of Specifications (example)

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The pushBuffer

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Invariant : $stack.length \leq max$

Events : push the button (which pushes an arbitrary element of type α to in buffer)

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

Bounded buffer (B0) : Put

guard : $size + 1 \leq SizeMax$

action : $size := size + 1$

Button : Push

guard : $\neg pressed$

action : $pressed := true$

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

Bounded buffer (B0) : Put

guard : $size + 1 \leq SizeMax$

action : $size := size + 1$

Button : Push

guard : $\neg pressed$

action : $pressed := true$

The pushBuffer

guard : $stack.length + 1 \leq SizeMax \wedge \neg pressed$

action : $stack := x :: stack, pushed := true$

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

```
def PushBuffer.PushAdd : OrdinaryEvent (PushBuffer ctx  $\alpha$ )  $\alpha$  Unit :=  
  {  
    guard m _      :=  $\neg$  m.pushed  $\wedge$  m.stack.length + 1  $\leq$  ctx.maxSize  
    action m x _    := ((), { stack := x::m.stack, pushed := true })  
    safety := by simp [Machine.invariant]  
  }
```

Method

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

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def PushBuffer.PushAdd : OrdinaryEvent (PushBuffer ctx  $\alpha$ )  $\alpha$  Unit :=  
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```

Method

- 1 We define the event PushAdd as an OrdinaryEvent (we use the structure API)

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

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    safety := by simp [Machine.invariant]  
  }
```

Method

- 1 We define the event PushAdd as an OrdinaryEvent (we use the structure API)
- 2 Then we can instantiate the *typeclass SafeREventPO* twice (next slide !)

Multiple refinement of Events (example)

```
instance : SafeREventPO
  PushBuffer.PushAdd.toEvent
  (AM := Button)
  Button.Push.toEvent
  (instSafeEv :=
    instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent
    PushBuffer.PushAdd)
  (instSafeAbs :=
    instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent
    Button.Push)
where
  lift_in := λ _ => () ; lift_out := id
  simulation      := /- [...] -/
  strengthening   := /- [...] -/
```

```
instance : SafeREventPO
  PushBuffer.PushAdd.toEvent
  (AM := B0 ctx)
  B0.Put.toEvent
  (instSafeEv :=
    instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent
    PushBuffer.PushAdd)
  (instSafeAbs :=
    instSafeEventPO_OrdinaryEvent B0.Put)
where
  lift_in := λ _ => () ; lift_out := id
  strengthening      := /- [...] -/
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```

Multi-refinement in Event B

- Sometimes discussed, sometimes wished for, never (to our knowledge) implemented for Event B tools...

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T. S. Hoang, D. Basin, and J.-R. Abrial, *Specifying Access Control in Event-B*[HBA09]

- Model of a Bank following Event B method
- Use of two separate abstract models (transactions and security protocol)
- One concrete model (the secured system of transactions)
- Multi-refinement would be a good way to **combine** specifications
- Not possible with the Event B ecosystem (they found a "workaround")

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V. Filou, M. Mosbah, and M. Tounsi, *Towards Proved Distributed Algorithms through Refinement, Composition and Local Computations*,[FMT13]

- "We think that a form of multirefinement would prevent the duplication of proofs and allow better automation of the approach"

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Future works

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- Possible extension of this topic towards probabilistic reactive programming (Doctoral Research Project with Christine Tasson, Frédéric Peschanski and Romain Demangeon)

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